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SUMMARY 
The Alberta government has been spending a lot of money lately on infrastructure, 
possibly partly because it was under the impression that Alberta suffered an 
infrastructure deficit relative to other provinces. That impression was provided in 
a 2015 capital-planning report by former Bank of Canada governor David Dodge, 
commissioned by the NDP government. Dodge also suggested that the province 
had ample room to borrow aggressively to catch up to the five other provinces to 
which he had compared Alberta (namely: B.C., Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario 
and Quebec). Unfortunately, it appears that impression was inaccurate.
Vast amounts of public money may have been spent, and unnecessary debt 
incurred, all based on a faulty justification. However, measured using alternative 
ratios, Alberta actually has a substantial infrastructure surplus relative to the 
other provinces. Thankfully, the Alberta government only partially followed 
Dodge’s aggressive program for borrowing and building. Had it followed it 
entirely, Alberta’s debt — again, using seemingly more appropriate measures 
than those used by Dodge — would have risen far higher than it is (or is projected 
to become) today, by some measures exceeding all other comparison provinces 
except Ontario.
By comparing Alberta against those other provinces, Dodge missed an important 
point: That Alberta is different. Dodge measured the value of provincial capital 
stock against GDP, but Alberta’s economy features far higher productivity 
levels than those other provinces. Using GDP as the benchmark for necessary 
infrastructure suggests that a more productive worker requires more roads, 
highways, bridges, water-treatment, and so forth, than a less productive worker, 
which is questionable. A seemingly more appropriate way to assess the need for 
infrastructure would be based on population and population growth, so on a per 
capita basis. Measured on a per capita basis, Alberta has a 15-per-cent greater 
stock than any of the other provinces, including a startling 44-per-cent surplus 
over Ontario. Had Alberta followed Dodge’s advice entirely, and achieved a ratio 
1of capital stock to GDP equivalent to the average of the other provinces, its surplus over 
the other provinces would have grown to a stunning 46-per-cent greater than the five-
province average in contrast to the current 24-per-cent.
The Alberta government’s infrastructure spending has been erratic. It has followed a 
pattern of wild swings over the past several decades, with splurges on capital investments 
during one part of an economic cycle, and then starving capital needs during another 
part. This is the fundamental problem that the Alberta government needs to address if 
it wants to avoid misguided infrastructure plans, whether for increases or for decreases. 
Alberta must develop a more stable planning and funding structure for its capital plan 
that accounts for ongoing maintenance and expansions for population and economic 
growth only, and stick to it. It is entirely possible to make capital spending sufficient and 
more stable in Alberta, if governments would only exhibit the political will to do so.
21. INTRODUCTION
Adequate public infrastructure is essential to serve citizens and to support a productive economy. 
Public capital and investment get special attention in Alberta with its rapidly, though erratically, 
growing population and economy. Even during economic downturns, infrastructure receives 
particular attention as the province wrestles with still-growing needs and concerns for economic 
stabilization but with diminished funds. Understanding better the important roles of provincial 
capital and investment within the uniqueness of the Alberta economic environment motivates  
this study.
The analysis of the paper begins with a brief overview of capital assets in Alberta. Those are 
dominated by highways and buildings, which are dedicated to transportation, health care and 
education. The next section is a review of aggregate provincial government investment and capital-
stock levels from 1961 to 2016. The most notable findings are the vast swings in investment and 
even large swings in per person levels of capital stocks. Section 4 presents an examination of the 
anomaly that Alberta, relative to other provinces, has a low level of provincial net capital stock 
relative to GDP but a high level of capital stock and investment per person. The explanation, 
as demonstrated here and not generally recognized, is that the Alberta economy is different in 
important ways from that of most other provinces. The analysis suggests that interprovincial 
comparisons to GDP can often be misleading. Also, household income, not GDP, appears to be the 
major determinant of public infrastructure. 
Section 5 looks at capital financing. Since 2008, there has been a growing reliance on debt finance. 
Also, what appear to be (interprovincially) moderate levels of debt relative to GDP are large relative 
to provincial government revenue (which is argued to be a more meaningful comparator). The role 
of provincial government investment as a stabilization tool is the subject of Section 6. Over the 
long term, the use for stabilization has been mixed. The overall surplus/deficit pattern, however, 
has been much more counter-cyclic. Since 2000, and especially in the 2009 and 2015 downturns, 
more emphasis has been put on stabilization but at the cost of greatly reduced financial reserves and 
growing debt (with debt increasing even as the economy gradually improves). The reason for these 
developments is that both resource-revenue setbacks (the lasting drop in natural gas prices and the 
drop in oil prices that are expected to diminish the provincial government’s resource revenues for 
some time) have been treated as if caused by cyclic rather than structural changes. Possible avenues 
for improving budgeting and particularly capital budgeting are addressed in Section 7. The final 
part of the paper is a summary and conclusion. 
2. PROVINCIAL CAPITAL ASSETS IN ALBERTA
It is helpful to begin with an understanding of what constitutes provincial government capital 
assets (also referred to broadly as provincial government infrastructure). Table 1 provides two 
descriptions of the Alberta government’s capital assets. The upper panel lists the types of capital 
assets of the province and the distribution of net book value as reported in the government’s latest 
annual report. In that analysis, a distinction is made between infrastructure and general capital 
assets. Infrastructure represents 39 per cent of the total capital assets and infrastructure is almost 
entirely transportation related (notably roads, highways and bridges). Only small shares are found 
in dams and water-management structures or land improvements. General capital assets represent 
61 per cent of the total capital assets and buildings make up four-fifths of that class. In fact, at 
49 per cent, buildings represent half of the provincial government’s total capital assets. Other 
types of general capital — that is, equipment, computers, land and other — make relatively small 
contributions. Overall, buildings and highways (and bridges) amount to about 85 per cent of the 
Alberta government’s capital assets.
3The lower panel in Table 1 provides insight into the government programs to which the capital 
assets are devoted. Lacking an inventory of assets by program, the data reported are the planned 
capital expenditures (both for new capital and for maintenance and renewal) for the next five years 
as outlined in Budget 2018. Roads and bridges take the largest share at 27 per cent, but are closely 
followed by health care at 25 per cent. Education in aggregate is expected to receive 20 per cent of 
capital expenditures (about two-thirds for schooling and one-third for adult education). Ten per cent 
of outlays are to be directed towards climate change and environmental protection, and eight per 
cent to government facilities and equipment. The other five program areas noted represent less than 
10 per cent of the total.
Overall, the provincial government’s capital assets are primarily in highways and in buildings.  
In turn, the majority of the province’s capital is devoted to supporting transportation, health care 
and education.
TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF ALBERTA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT’S CAPITAL ASSETS BY TYPE AND PROGRAM
Alberta Government Tangible Assets by Type, 2018a
Percentage
General Capital Assets 61.33
Buildings 49.11
Equipment 4.18
Computer (hardware & software) 2.13
Land 5.24
Other 0.67
Infrastructure 38.66
Highways, roads & airstrips 32.86
Bridges 3.15
Dams & water management structures 2.11
Land improvements 0.54
Total 100.00
Alberta Core Government Capital Spending Plan by Program, 2018/19 to 2022/23b
Percentage
Adult education & skills 6.55
Agriculture, natural resources & industry 2.14
Climate change, environment 10.02
Family, social support & housing 3.67
Gov’t facilities, equipment & other 7.82
Health 25.33
Public safety & emergency 1.93
Roads and bridges 26.68
Schools 13.66
Sport, arts, recreation & culture 1.00
Other 1.20
Total 100.00
Notes: a) From Annual Report of Government of Alberta, 2017–18, p 76. b) The five-year capital spending plan of the 
Alberta government from Budget 2018. Data are for core provincial government, which here excludes the self-financed 
capital expenditures of the SUCH sector (i.e., school, universities, colleges and health authorities) and excludes grants to 
the municipal governments, but does include planned capital maintenance and renewal outlays by program.
43. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURES IN ALBERTA
Public infrastructure provides vital services to citizens and to the economy. As such, one might 
expect that, over time, the public capital stock would tend to grow in parallel with the population 
and the economy and that infrastructure investment would expand in a corresponding fashion. 
Yet, in Alberta, despite the considerable population and economic growth, the evidence suggests 
otherwise. That is, the levels of and the development of infrastructure have been quite uneven 
over time. 
The trends in Alberta provincial government infrastructure investment and capital stock are 
reported in Figure 1. That figure shows the levels of real investment (in chained 2007 dollars), 
real net capital stock (for ease of comparison, converted to just one-tenth of the actual total), 
depreciation (linear), and the provincial population growth rates from 1961 to 2016 in Alberta.1,2 
Since 1961, population has increased in a relatively steady fashion, although at a rather high rate 
of about 2.8 per cent annually up to 1982 and then, after a distinct slump during the mid-1980s, 
at an average rate of almost 2.0 per cent from 1989 to 2016. In contrast, provincial investment has 
been highly variable, showing at least three distinct peaks and two distinct valleys and ranging 
from $446 to $1,489 per capita. The stock of provincial infrastructure follows a wave-like pattern. 
Most notable is the hump extending over the 1980s and 1990s, but there were run-ups during the 
1960s and from 2006 to 2010, which seem to have established new plateaus. The high levels of 
investment during the 1980s and the dramatic disinvestment during the 1990s generated the hump. 
The swings in the Alberta government’s infrastructure stock and investment since the 1970s have 
been substantial, and possibly concerning. Of particular significance is that for most of the 1990s, 
investment fell below depreciation and for several years was at the lowest levels during the study 
period — a feature that contributed to what many regarded as a subsequent infrastructure deficit.
1 Investment and stock is non-residential. That, in the provincial government sector, is as reported in CANSIM table 310005 
as indexed using chained 2007 dollars. The provincial government component is determined by subtracting from total 
government amounts those for defence services, other federal government services, other municipal government services 
and other Aboriginal government services.
2 For comparison, the distribution of the net capital stock by type in Alberta in 2017 from CANSIM is similar to but 
somewhat different from that reported in Table 1 from the Alberta public accounts. The Statistics Canada data report 
buildings comprising 58.8 per cent, engineering 29 per cent, machinery and equipment 3.7 per cent, and intellectual 
property 8.5 per cent.
5FIGURE 1  ALBERTA GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCK, INVESTMENT AND DEPRECIATION, PER CAPITA, 
CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS, 1961–2016
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Figure 1. Alberta Government Net Capital Stock, Investment and        
Depreciation, Per Capita, Chained 2007 Dollars, 1961–2016
Sources: CANSIM 310005, 510001 and 510024. 
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Municipal governments contribute significantly to public infrastructure within provinces and that 
should be acknowledged. It is also important to recognize municipal infrastructure because the 
provincial government makes major contributions towards municipal investments. From 1988 
to 2008, provincial capital grants funded one-third of Alberta municipalities’ capital spending 
and, from 2004 to 2008, grants covered 40 per cent.3 Figure 3 shows the real per person levels of 
municipal, provincial government and combined provincial and municipal government investment 
from 1961 to 2016. Municipal investment has averaged one-third of the total provincial and 
municipal investment but has recently grown in importance (and, at least up to 2005, was more 
stable than provincial government investment). Since 2005, municipal investments increased 
from about $500 per person to over $1,000 per capita (in real dollars) and, since 2010, they 
have essentially equalled the level of provincial government investment. As a consequence, the 
municipal share of the combined provincial and municipal capital stock has increased from one-
third to almost one-half. Figure 4 shows the recent absolute and relative growth of the municipal 
per capita capital stock. As of 2016, the per capita capital stock of the municipal governments was 
$9,981 and that of the provincial government was $10,415. A resurgence of investment beginning 
in 2005 has led to higher per capita levels of provincial capital stock but also to an especially large 
increase in the capital stocks of Alberta’s municipal governments.
3 Statistics Canada does not provide comparable data for more recent years. However, Alberta data indicate that provincial 
grants for capital amounted to 32 per cent of the cost of municipal capital purchased in 2016.
6FIGURE 2  MUNICIPAL, PROVINCIAL AND COMBINED PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT, 
ALBERTA, PER CAPITA, CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS
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Figure 2. Municipal, Provincial and Combined Provincial and Municipal 
Government Investment, Alberta, Per Capita, Chained 2007 Dollars
Sources: CANSIM 310005, 510001 and 510024.
FIGURE 3  MUNICIPAL, PROVINCIAL AND COMBINED PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL 
STOCK, ALBERTA, PER CAPITA CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS
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Figure 3. Municipal, Provincial and Combined Provincial and Municipal 
Government Net Capital Stock, lberta, Per Capita Chained 2007 Dollars
Sources: CANSIM 350005,  510001 and 510024.
4. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN ALBERTA AND OTHER PROVINCES
Especially since the fall 2015 Alberta budget, there has been considerable interest in Alberta’s 
infrastructure and its finance. Appended to the 2015–18 Strategic Plan of the October 2015 budget 
was a report by David Dodge, former governor of the Bank of Canada and now with Bennett 
Jones LLP, advising the government on its plans for capital spending and its finance. Notably, 
Dodge recommended expanded capital spending largely on the grounds that Alberta lacked 
sufficient infrastructure compared to other provinces — a recommendation that the Alberta 
government has followed to a considerable degree.4 In this section, I examine the contention that 
Alberta’s infrastructure is insufficient. I do that first by comparing the per capita levels among 
4 
That the expanded capital spending program should largely be debt financed was also part of the Dodge recommendation. 
That recommendation and capital finance in general will be discussed later in this paper.
7several provinces. As in the Dodge report, I compare Alberta to British Columbia, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec.5 The results of the analysis suggest reasons to question the 
insufficiency claim. I then look more closely at Dodge’s reason for arguing insufficiency, which is 
low provincial investment relative to GDP, and conclude that comparison to GDP is a questionable 
standard for interprovincial comparisons that include Alberta. An overview of the economic 
characteristics of the provinces indicates that Alberta is unlike the other provinces in important 
ways. The final part of this section reviews the results from some simple econometric models that 
were used to explore the determinants of capital-stock levels. Each undertaking is reported in turn.6
4.1. Per Capita Levels
The comparison of investment and net capital stock per person across the provinces indicates that 
Alberta has tended to invest more heavily and maintain a higher capital stock than the five other 
provinces. Figure 4 demonstrates this for investment. Obviously, per capita investment in Alberta 
has exceeded the five-province average in all but three years (1995–97).7 The difference overall 
is considerable: the 56-year average is $866 for Alberta and $626 for the five provinces. A natural 
consequence is that the per capita capital stock in Alberta exceeds that of the five-province average 
as shown in Figure 5. Indeed, the Alberta level exceeded that of any other province throughout.8 
The 1980s–’90s bulge stands out, but the recent Alberta level remains about one-quarter larger, 
much the same as in the 1960s. In contrast, the average of the five provinces declined from $6,772 
in 1979 to $6,008 in 1998 before climbing to $8,475 in 2016.
FIGURE 4  PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PER CAPITA INVESTMENT: ALBERTA AND FIVE- PROVINCE AVERAGE, 
CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS, 1961–2016
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Figure 4. Provincial Government Per Capita Investment: Alberta and Five-
Province Average, Chained 2007 Dollars, 1961–2016
Sources: CANSIM 310005, 510001 and 510024.
5 That is, comparisons are made with the two largest provinces and with Alberta’s neighbours.
6 This portion of the paper updates and extends my earlier analysis of the Dodge report (McMillan 2015b).
7 Indeed, only occasionally has the level of investment in any province exceeded the level in Alberta.
8 
There is one minor exception. The per capita stock in Saskatchewan did equal that of Alberta in 1979 and 1980. The 
Saskatchewan levels exceeded those of the provinces other than Alberta between 1971 and 2010. Stocks in Ontario are 
typically the lowest among the six provinces after the early 1970s. 
8FIGURE 5  PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PER CAPITA NET CAPITAL STOCK: ALBERTA AND FIVE-PROVINCE  
AVERAGE, CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS
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Figure 5. Provincial Government Per Capita Net Capital Stock:
Alberta and Five-Province Average, Chained 2007 Dollars
Sources: CANSIM 310005, 510001 and 510024.
The five-province average masks the interprovincial variation. Figure 6 reports the average per 
capita net capital stock over the five years 2012 to 2016. Among the five provinces, that stock ranges 
from a low of $7,138 in Ontario to $8,929 in Saskatchewan.9 With the other provinces having stocks 
of over $8,200 per capita, the low level in Ontario is notable. Alberta, on the other hand, stands 
out with a per capita stock of $10,268. That level is 15-per-cent greater than the level in any other 
province, 24-per-cent larger than the five-province average, and 44 per cent over that in Ontario. 
Clearly, these data undermine the contention that Alberta lacks sufficient provincial capital relative 
to other provinces. Furthermore, if Alberta realized a capital stock of 16 per cent of GDP (the 
objective Dodge recommended), it would have a per capita level of $12,089 which is 17.5-per-cent 
greater than the $10,268 and 46-per-cent greater than the five-province average.10
9 The numbers here, and in McMillan (2015), for Manitoba and Saskatchewan are considerably lower than those reported in 
Dodge. The reason is that the Dodge numbers for those two provinces mistakenly included municipal as well as provincial 
net capital stocks.
10 The structure of the Alberta government’s capital stock (i.e., across buildings, engineering, machinery and equipment, and 
intellectual) parallels that in other provinces, with the possible exception of the intellectual-property share being somewhat 
lower.
9FIGURE 6 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL PER CAPITA, 2012–2016 AVERAGE, CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS
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Sources: CANSIM 350001,and 510001. 
Considering municipal government capital as well as provincial capital expands the differential 
between Alberta and the other provinces. Figure 7 reports the provincial per capita stock (as above) 
plus the municipal government stock to show the 2012–16 average per capita combined provincial 
and municipal stock. Municipal capital adds significantly to the sub-national capital stock within 
a province. Over the five years 2012 to 2016, among the five other provinces, municipal capital 
contributes between 34 per cent (Quebec) and 41 per cent (Ontario) of the combined municipal 
and provincial government capital while, in Alberta, it represents 47 per cent. The inclusion of 
municipal capital reduces the differences among the other provinces — primarily by increasing the 
subnational government stock in Ontario. Although Ontario still remains the lowest and Manitoba 
the highest among the five, the range (high less low) for the provincial plus municipal stock is 
$1,422 as opposed to $1,791 for the provincial stock only (a difference relative to the averages of 
11 per cent rather than 22 per cent). Again, Alberta stands out as the province with the highest 
provincial ($10,268), municipal ($9,181) and combined ($19,449) capital stocks of the six provinces. 
Incorporating municipal capital magnifies the extent of the per capita capital-stock premium in 
Alberta. Alberta’s total of $19,449 is 50-per-cent larger than the five-province average of $12,933 
(compared to 24 per cent for provincial government capital). 
10
FIGURE 7  PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL NET CAPITAL STOCK PER CAPITA, 2012–16 AVERAGE,  
CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS
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Figure 7. Provincial and Municipal Net Capital Stock Per Capita,
2012–16 Average, Chained 2007 Dollars
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Sources: CANSIM 350001 and 510001.
Alberta has consistently had a larger municipal-plus-provincial per person capital stock than the 
five provinces since 1961 (see Figure 8). The difference expanded during the 1980s and declined 
in the 1990s, decreased somewhat more until 2005, before expanding considerably thereafter. The 
recent growth in the Alberta difference can be attributed largely to growth in the municipal share 
in Alberta (e.g., compare Figure 8 with figures 5 and 3). Real per capita municipal capital has 
doubled since 2005 and the municipal share has increased from 36 to 49 per cent in that time. The 
municipal share has grown in only two of the other five provinces (in Manitoba and Saskatchewan 
and from about 28 to 34 per cent). In the other three provinces, the municipal share has been 
essentially stable since 2005.
FIGURE 8  COMBINED PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCK, PER CAPITA,  
CHAINED 2007 DOLLARS, 1961–2016
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Figure 8. Combined Provincial and Municipal Government Net Capital Stock,  
Per Capita, Chained 2007 Dollars, 1961–2016
Sources: CANSIM 350001, 510001 and 510024.
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The evidence indicates clearly that Alberta’s government capital stock is relatively large and that 
that difference has persisted since (at least) 1961. The real per capita capital stock in Alberta at both 
the provincial and the municipal levels has consistently exceeded that in the other five provinces. 
Hence, looking at the data on a per capita basis definitely raises questions about any insufficiency 
of government capital in Alberta.
4.2. Government Capital Relative to GDP
Dodge concluded that the Alberta government’s investment and capital stock was deficient by 
comparing investment and capital stock relative to GDP in Alberta and the other five provinces 
(British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec). For example, over the 20 years 
he analyzed (1994–2013), the average investment was 1.48 per cent of GDP in Alberta while the 
(weighted) average in the other five provinces was 1.98 per cent. And, in 2013, real net provincial 
capital stock as a percentage of GDP was the lowest in Alberta at 14.2 per cent, while in the other 
provinces it ranged from 16.0 per cent in Saskatchewan to 21.8 per cent in Manitoba.
It is useful to look at provincial investment and capital stock relative to GDP over a longer period. 
Figure 9 shows provincial government investment as a percentage of GDP for Alberta and the 
five-province average from 1961 to 2016. Indeed, by this measure, investment in Alberta has been 
below the five-province average since the early 1990s. Prior to that, Alberta’s investment was about 
or above the average.11 Capital stock as a percentage of GDP is reported in Figure 10. For most 
years since 1973, the beginning of a major energy boom in Alberta, Alberta’s capital stock has 
been a smaller percentage of GDP than that for the five-province average. The only time since then 
during which the Alberta level reached (or slightly exceeded) the average was from about 1983 to 
1994, a time when Alberta was in the top of its capital bulge and had real per capita capital stocks 
exceeding even recent levels. That is, other than for a period of exceptional investment and capital-
stock levels, Alberta’s capital stock to GDP has been below the five-province average (and typically 
below that of any other province) since the energy boom emerging in 1973.12, 13 Of further note in 
Figure 10 is the 30-year declining trend in provincial (and subnational infrastructure), a feature that 
attracted attention and concern.14
11 
Percentages are calculated using real chained 2007 dollars. Real dollar values by province for GDP extend back only to 
1980. Prior values were calculated using the Canadian implicit price index for GDP. 
12 A graph for combined provincial and municipal net capital stocks follows a similar pattern but for the Alberta level 
approaching the five-province average after 2009 and actually reaching the average in 2016.
13 Up until 2003, it is actually Ontario that normally had the lowest provincial government capital stock as a percentage of 
GDP.
14 The Federation of Canadian Municipalities has been a major advocate of increased spending on (especially municipal) 
infrastructure.
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FIGURE 9  PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1961–2016
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Figure 9. Provincial Government Investment as a Percentage of GDP, 
1961–2016
Sources: CANSIM 310005 and 3840038. 
FIGURE 10  PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCK AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1961–2016
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Figure 10. Provincial Government Net Capital Stock as a Percentage of GDP, 
1961–2016
Sources: CANSIM 310005 and 3840038.
Alberta’s provincial capital stock has been a smaller percentage of GDP than that in the five 
provinces since the early 1990s and typically smaller since the 1973 energy boom. Yet, Alberta’s 
per capita real net capital stock exceeds and has consistently exceeded that in the other five 
provinces. These diverging indicators present a conundrum especially as they may suggest 
conflicting recommendations for provincial government investment. This puzzle is explored next.
4.3. Is Alberta Different?
The lingering difference between indicators of the adequacy of Alberta’s public capital raises the 
question of what the appropriate standard of comparison among provinces is. Is it public capital 
stock relative to population, or relative to GDP, or neither, or both, or something else? A closely 
related question is: is Alberta different? Table 2 provides various measures that, for our purposes, 
13
serve to characterize the six provinces. Recent values of those indicators are provided and also 
their 1990 to 2016 averages. The recent values are for both 2013 and 2016.15 The reason for those 
two is that 2013 was, as comparison with the 1990–2016 averages confirms, more characteristic 
of the long-term pattern, while 2016, which was during the recession that followed the collapse of 
oil prices in 2014–15, demonstrates the sensitivity of Alberta’s economic conditions to the state of 
the energy sector. The discussion will look at the 2013 data and the 1990–2016 averages and then 
reflect briefly on the changes occurring between 2013 and 2016.
For ease of comparison, the provincial government sector real net capital stock per capita in 2013, 
previously reflected in Figure 6, is provided in the first line of the table. The provincial capital 
stock as a percentage of GDP follows. These are the two measures that are the focus of the above 
discussion. As has been observed, the per capita amount for Alberta is relatively large while the 
percentage of GDP is relatively low (for both 2013 and the long-term average). 
Turning to the other indicators, GDP per person is and has been much higher in Alberta. Both in 
2013 and from 1990 to 2013, GDP per capita has been about 63-per-cent larger in Alberta than the 
five-province average. Note too, however, that the GDP levels are most similar among Ontario, 
Manitoba and British Columbia, with Quebec trailing somewhat. Also note that Saskatchewan 
(which, like Alberta, is a resource-oriented economy), is noticeably above the levels in the other 
four provinces.
The distribution of factor incomes also varies among the provinces. Approximately 50 per cent is 
paid as compensation to employees in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia but that 
share is notably smaller in Alberta, at about 46 per cent, and even lower (averaging about 40 per 
cent) in Saskatchewan. Corporate net operating surpluses as a percentage of GDP have the opposite 
pattern. The figure is lowest in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia (averaging in the 
10- to 13-per-cent range since 1990) and is larger in Alberta and Saskatchewan at about 20 per cent 
(with a particularly strong showing at 27.5 per cent in Saskatchewan in 2013).
Wide differences in the non-government capital stock among provinces are a reason for the 
differences in the distribution of factor incomes. Non-government, non-residential net capital 
stock per person is greatest in Alberta at $143,783 in 2013 and lowest in Quebec and Ontario at 
approximately $27,650 per capita. The levels in Manitoba and British Columbia are next largest at 
$36,704 and $42,597 respectively. The level in Saskatchewan, at $89,851, sits well below Alberta 
but well above the other four provinces.
15 The 2013 data reported here have been updated with the latest numbers and so may differ marginally from those reported in 
McMillan (2015b).
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TABLE 2 PROVINCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
2013 Valuea (above) & 2016 Value (below)
AB QC ON MB SK BC
Provincial Govt Sector Capital Stock (2007$ chained) 1028310415
8321
8445
7111
7229
8805
8897
8663
9595b
8235
8211
Provincial Govt Sector Capital Stock as % of GDP (both 2007$ chained) 13.414.5
20.6
20.5
15.3
14.8
19.5
19.4
15.4
17.6
17.4
16.2
GDP Per Capita (2007$ chained) 76,86371,469
40,389
41,248
46,613
49,012 
45,176
45,857
56,281
54,442
47,239
50,618
Compensation of Employees as % of GDP 47.051.2
53.0
52.8
53.5
52.3
49.3
49.8
36.8
42.4
49.9
48.7
Corporate Net Operating Surplus as % of GDP 18.64.8
11.6
11.8
12.2
13.6
14.1
12.0
27.5
13.3
10.1
11.1
Non-Govt, Non-Residential Net Capital Stock Per Capita (2007$ chained) 143,783148,671
27,671
27,458
27,637
28,096
36,704
40,168
89,851
96,671
42,597
43,346
Household Income Per Capita (nominal $) 56,51056,088
40,178
43,377
43,801
47,743
40,091
43,050
47,256
48,698
44,249
48,828
Household Income as % of GDP (nominal $) 66.075.4
89.8
91.4
85.4
83.9
81.4
83.6
62.8
74.3
88.7
88.1
1990-2016 Average
AB QC ON MB SK BC
Provincial Govt Sector Capital Stock (2007$ chained) 9645 6279 5763 6996 8233 7140
Provincial Govt Sector Capital Stock as % of GDP (both 2007$ chained) 14.5 17.2 13.4 18.2 17.8 17.2
GDP Per Capita (2007$ chained) 67,430 36,312 43,064 38,459 47,239 41,628
Compensation of Employees as % of GDP 46.0 52.3 53.0 49.9 40.3 51.1
Corporate Net Operating Surplus as % of GDP 19.1 11.8 11.3 12.9 20.8 10.0
Non-Govt, Non-Residential Net Capital Stock Per Capita (2007$ chained) 108,493 26,687 28,471 31,960 63,427 36,389
Household Income Per Capita (nominal $) 38,931 30,435 34,673 29,469 30,973 33,555
Household Income as % of GDP (nominal $) 70.3 89.1 85.1 84.5 73.0 88.3
Note: a) 2013 values are updated from McMillan (2015b) using the latest data. b) The 2016 value appears to be an 
anomaly in the capital stock data as the value for 2015 is $8,981.
Interprovincial differences in per person non-government net capital stock do not necessarily 
translate into parallel differences in residents’ incomes. In 2013, and also since 1990, household 
per capita incomes were relatively similar across the five provinces other than Alberta. In 2013, 
incomes ranged from $40,178 to $47,256 but incomes and non-government capital stock ranked 
differently. Also, relative incomes shifted over time. At $56,510 per person in 2013, household 
income was substantially higher in Alberta — almost one-third greater than the five-province 
average. That was not always the case. Incomes in Alberta began to diverge from the pack at the 
turn of the century with a recovery in the energy sector.16 The 1990 to 2016 average for Alberta is 
only about 22 per cent above the five-province average rather than 33-per-cent larger as in 2013. 
Note too that per capita household income in Saskatchewan in 2013 was the highest of the five 
provinces, but its 1990 to 2016 average was below average (and the average from 1990 to 2013 was 
the lowest). Incomes in Saskatchewan surged after 2007.
16 
Only Ontario experienced higher per capita incomes than Alberta did from the mid-1980s and through the 1990s.
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Household incomes also differ as a percentage of GDP. Household income is typically in the 85-to-
90-per-cent range in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia, but at considerably lower 
levels in Alberta and Saskatchewan (i.e., the low 70s). In 2013, the percentage in Alberta was 66 
and in Saskatchewan it was 62.8.17
The 2014–15 drop in oil prices had a substantial, adverse impact on the Alberta economy — an 
impact that results in some of the 2016 figures not being representative of the longer-term situation 
in the province. Per capita real GDP in Alberta (and Saskatchewan) fell between 2013 and 2016 (by 
seven per cent) while it increased in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba and B.C. Employee compensation 
as a percentage of GDP in Alberta rose to exceed (rather than be below) the five-province average. 
Corporate net operating surplus was especially hard hit, falling from 18.6 per cent of GDP to 4.8 
per cent — much below the five-province average of 12.4 per cent. (Note also the sharp declines 
in employee compensation and corporate net operating surpluses in Saskatchewan.) Nominal per 
capita household income declined in Alberta between 2013 and 2016 but increased in the other 
provinces (including Saskatchewan). Despite the drop, per capita household income in Alberta 
remained 21-per-cent above the average, but down from 31-per-cent greater in 2013. Despite 
the drop in household income, household income increased as a share of GDP in Alberta (and 
Saskatchewan). In Alberta it increased from 66 to 75.4 per cent of GDP, but still is relatively 
low compared to the 84.3-per-cent five-province average (an average that includes the increased 
percentage of 74.3 in Saskatchewan). While the recession had large impacts on certain indicators 
(notably per capita GDP, per capita household incomes, employee compensation and corporate 
operating surpluses), those impacts are likely to have been the most negative in 2016, although 
there is expected to be some moderation of those differences over time. Regardless, Alberta has 
unique characteristics.
Table 2 demonstrates that the Alberta economy is different in some rather important ways 
from those of the other five provinces and, particularly, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and British 
Columbia. Albertans work with large amounts of private sector capital, produce a high level of 
GDP per person and, particularly over the past 20 years, earn high incomes (despite incomes being 
a lower share of GDP). The Dodge report acknowledges this (page 16), but apparently believes 
that those differences should not modify the percentage of GDP that provincial government capital 
should be and recommends that Alberta meet the 16-per-cent benchmark that is the weighted 
average of the five other provinces. Dodge notes, “…real economic activity per capita is far more 
intense in Alberta than in the other provinces and public capital has not kept pace with this activity 
to the same extent as in the other provinces over the past 20 years.” One expects that public 
capital would increase in parallel with population but is it to be expected that it should increase 
proportionately with output per capita? Do more productive workers need proportionately more 
public infrastructure?18 
17 Saskatchewan too does not quite parallel the other provinces, including Alberta.
18 
While it is true that the provincial capital stock as a percentage of GDP has declined relative to the five-province average 
over the past 20 years (see Chart 4 in the Dodge report), that decline may not represent a serious deterioration in its 
productive contribution. Rather, the high percentages observed in the mid-1990s may represent the tailing off (due to 
deterioration of economic and fiscal conditions) of the large increase in capital spending that followed the 1970s energy 
boom and that saw the provincial capital stock climb to almost 23 per cent of GDP in the mid-1980s.
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4.4. Some Econometric Explorations
In an effort to obtain a better understanding of the determinants of the levels of public capital, some 
simple econometric explorations were undertaken. The basic model seeks to explain provincial 
government capital stock per capita or as a percentage of GDP with population, population growth 
rate, real GDP per person and real household income per person as the potential explanatory 
variables. In addition, some variables characterizing provincial governments’ fiscal situations were 
included. Data cover 1981 to 2016.19 The following summarizes what appear to be robust results 
from numerous regressions. Illustrations are provided in Appendix A. 
First, Alberta is definitely distinct from the other five provinces. Saskatchewan, too, seems distinct. 
Indeed, models estimated for Alberta and Saskatchewan combined and for the four other provinces 
together (Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia) perform well. These results suggest 
that the four- (not five-) province group is a more homogeneous group for comparison. Even so, the 
results also suggest that decisions on provincial capital stock have been different in Alberta than in 
the other (and especially the other four) provinces over the period examined. This implies, based 
on the decisions made over 36 years, that the levels per capita or as a percentage of GDP elsewhere 
may not be applicable to Alberta. 
A second interesting result relates to the role of GDP per person. Per capita GDP allows for the 
“real economic activity per capita” that the Dodge report emphasizes. Included here also is real 
household income per capita — included to reflect differences in household income to GDP among 
the provinces and to reflect the possible impact of residents’ income on demand for (and possibly 
the cost of) provincial capital stock. Despite being correlated, both GDP and household income per 
person have (highly) significant coefficients. Particularly interesting is that the coefficient of GDP 
per capita is negative while that for household income per person is positive. This indicates that the 
level of provincial government capital stock per person increases as household income becomes 
larger but, after controlling for income and other factors, the level is reduced as GDP per person 
increases.20, 21 These results suggest that GDP per person is itself not a good predictor of the levels 
of public capital stock. Determination of the levels is more complex and including both household 
income per person and GDP per person results in superior model performance (predictive power) 
and suggests that it is household income per person (not GDP per capita) that is the main (positive) 
driver of the levels of provincial capital stock (both differences among the provinces and trends 
19 
This period covers the full extent of the Statistics Canada series (Table 3840038) for GDP in chained 2007 dollars.
20 This feature exists also in regressions covering only the four most homogenous provinces (i.e., British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Ontario and Quebec) so it is not a consequence of including Alberta and Saskatchewan (or just Alberta). 
21 
In regressions on provincial capital as a percentage of GDP, the coefficient of the GDP variable tends to be somewhat larger 
than that of the household-income variable. In regressions on per capita provincial capital, the household-income coefficient 
exceeds that of the GDP variable.
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over time).22 This outcome persists whether the estimates are made across all six provinces, the 
other five provinces, the four provinces excluding Alberta and Saskatchewan or for Alberta  
and Saskatchewan.23, 24
The examination of the data in Table 2 plus the econometric explorations offer some cautionary 
insights. Alberta is different and comparison of its provincial capital stock levels with those 
of other provinces based on GDP may not be all that informative. The determination of public 
capital stocks is more complex than simply the relationship to GDP. Hence, setting an objective of 
provincial capital stock equal to16 per cent of GDP because that is the average of the level in five 
other provinces is probably an imperfect and unreliable benchmark.25
5. CAPITAL FINANCING: LONG-RUN IMPLICATIONS OF DEBT FINANCING
The Dodge report recommended that the Alberta government increase the net capital stock of the 
provincial government sector to 16 per cent of GDP (a long-term benchmark seen as characterizing 
the five other provinces) by 2019–20. Reaching and sustaining the 16-per-cent level into the 
future requires an extended commitment to considerable capital expenditure. Based on working 
assumptions (page 29 of the Dodge report) and simulations provided by Alberta Treasury Board 
and Finance, Dodge projected the public finance implications of the expanded capital program 
under four oil-price scenarios. For each oil-price scenario, and assuming (particularly) that the 
province’s non-resource revenues remain a constant portion of GDP, the simulations projected 
significant increases in the provincial debt in all four cases. Taking the low-to-mid oil-price 
scenario (i.e., low to 2019–20 and mid from then to 2024–25) as the preferred option (i.e., “probably 
the one that best balances the risks,” page 24), Dodge projected that “…net debt would stabilize 
about to 25 percent of GDP by the mid-2020s….” (page 30). The shift from a net financial asset 
position (which peaked at 15 per cent of GDP in 2007–08) to a net debt position leveling off at 
about 25 per cent of GDP has significant implications for the province’s fiscal situation.26
22 It has been suggested that these results might be due to combining quality-of-life and productivity-enhancing provincial 
capital. That is, productivity-enhancing infrastructure might be better explained by GDP and quality-of-life infrastructure 
by household income. As Table 1 indicates, most of the provincial capital is devoted to highways, health and education. 
Certainly that capital contributes to both productivity and quality of life. Even roads, which might be expected to be most 
closely related to productivity and GDP, have a quality-of-life component. The separation of productivity-enhancing and 
quality-of-life capital seems problematic and is left for future study.
23 
Population and population change were included in the econometric specification but are of little interest to the theme of 
the discussion. Also, those results are not very informative. For completeness, however, mention is made here. Including 
population allows for possible economies of population size. The coefficient of population is typically significant but the 
sign depends upon the specification and the method of estimation. Population change was not expected to play much of a 
role in explaining capital stock, and its coefficient is normally not statistically significant except in fixed-effects estimation.
24 
Adding provincial government fiscal variables contributed relatively little to the explanatory power of the regressions. 
Included were the per capita levels of investment income, transfers, interest expenditures and surplus/deficit. The most 
consistent outcome was that larger transfers were associated with higher levels of capital stock. Considerable collinearity 
exists among the variables, including with GDP and household incomes. Fiscal variables did, however, perform better in 
some exploratory regressions to explain annual provincial investments in capital stock. For discussion and illustrations of 
those regressions see Section 6 and Appendix B.
25 A provincial government’s capital expenditures are the product of a capital plan encompassing a large number of individual 
projects being undertaken in an environment of an existing infrastructure. The merits of those projects should be 
individually assessed and pass a social benefit-cost standard to warrant inclusion in the plan. Thus, capital spending is, or 
should be, the product of a myriad of (presumably well-made) micro decisions and not the result of pursuing some arbitrary 
macro benchmark. Dodge acknowledges the micro fundamentals but anticipates that the investments necessary to achieve 
the 16-per-cent benchmark would meet such a social rate-of-return standard. 
26 Chart 11 of the Dodge report illustrates the changes.
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Dodge considered provincial net debt at 25 per cent of GDP “moderate” by provincial standards 
and pointed to the then current (2014–15) levels in Quebec (51 per cent), Ontario (39 per cent) and 
British Columbia (16 per cent).27 To complete the comparison, the 2014–15 levels of net debt to GDP 
are shown for the six provinces in Figure 11 along with the projected level for Alberta in 2024–25. 
By this standard, a net debt level of 25 per cent appears not unreasonable.28
FIGURE 11 NET DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2014–15
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Figure 11. et Debt as a Percentage of GDP, 2014–15
Source: Finance Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables and CANSIM 3840038.
There is a problem with the Dodge proposal. While net debt of 25 per cent of GDP may appear 
moderate compared to other provinces, GDP is a questionable standard for comparison. Provincial 
governments differ considerably in their size relative to their economies. To demonstrate, Table 3 
reports the total revenues of the six provinces relative to their GDPs for 2016–17. The percentages 
range from 13.5 per cent in Alberta to 25.9 per cent in Quebec. Alberta has the smallest provincial 
government relative to its economy with a level only 65 per cent of the average of the other five 
provinces. Despite these differences, total revenues per capita are fairly similar. The average across 
the six provinces is $11,016 per person with a range from $9,893 in Alberta to $12,207 in Quebec.29 
Thus, it is argued that debt relative to provincial revenues is a valuable alternative measure, and 
(because it reflects the burden on provincial taxpayers) a more appropriate indicator, of a province’s 
capacity to bear debt.
27 
See page 19 and Chart 8 in the Dodge report.
28 
In addition, being unique among provinces in having positive net financial assets, Alberta has (as Dodge points out, page 
19) “…prudent room for net borrowing….”
29 
The situation for Alberta changed substantially between 2014–15 and 2016–17 due to the oil-price collapse and the 
accompanying recession. Total revenues fell from $49.5 to $42.4 billion and the province went from a $1.1-billion surplus 
to a $10.8-billion deficit. Per capita revenue dropped by $2,023 (with 71 per cent of that caused by the drop in resource 
revenues). Despite the drop in revenue and the move into deficit, revenues as a percentage of GDP increased from 12.1 per 
cent to 13.5 per cent between 2014–15 and 2016–17. Levels for 2014–15 are reported in McMillan (2015b).
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TABLE 3 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT TOTAL REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP AND PER CAPITA, 2016–17
QC ON MB SK AB BC
As % of GDP 25.9 17.7 23.1 18.1 13.5 19.5
$ Per Capita 12,207 9,915 11,690 11,707 9,893 10,682
Source: Finance Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables, 2017.
Using provincial government revenues rather than GDP as the base provides quite a different 
perspective on the magnitude of provincial debt and a province’s ability to finance that debt. 
Figure 12 shows the 2016–17 level of net debt as a percentage of total revenues for the six 
provinces. Quebec and Ontario stand out in that their net debt is 181 and 214 per cent respectively 
of provincial revenues. Net debt is lower in Manitoba at 148 per cent and the magnitudes in 
Saskatchewan and British Columbia are notably lower at about 74 per cent. In 2016–17, Alberta still 
had net financial assets (i.e., negative net debt). The Dodge report outlined a largely debt-financed 
capital program leading to debt stabilizing at 25 per cent of GDP as of 2024–25. Were Alberta now 
to have net debt equal to 25 per cent of GDP, Alberta’s net debt would amount to 186 per cent of 
provincial revenues.30 That would be a level of debt comparable to those in Quebec and Ontario, 
neither of which is in an enviable position and, as to be expected, the bond ratings of which (along 
with those of Manitoba) are below those of the other three provinces. Looked at in this context, a 
debt burden of 25 per cent of GDP seems less moderate and much less appealing than implied in 
the Dodge report (or as in other comparisons to GDP such as in Budget 2018, page 11). 
FIGURE 12 PROVINCIAL NET DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE, 2016–17
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The Alberta government has not followed the Dodge recommendations in full. In its October 2015 
budget, the province did expand the government’s capital spending (investment) program by 15 
per cent. Over the next three fiscal years the province spent $22.4 billion rather than its planned 
$22.2 billion, although not entirely according to the initial schedule. The three-year augmentation 
of capital spending was (following Dodge) largely a counter-cyclic measure to reduce the impacts 
of the recession. Now that the economy is gradually improving, the province is scaling back its 
capital program. Budget 2018 reports planned capital expenditures of approximately $6 billion 
30 
If the calculation were done using 2014–15 (updated) data, the percentage would, at 190 per cent, be almost the same.
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annually over the next five years.31 The capital plan to 2023–24 is more modest than what Dodge 
suggested and borrows much less. While Dodge recommended reaching balance in 2024–25 with 
net debt at 25 per cent of GDP, the Budget 2018 plan is to realize a balanced budget in 2023–24 
with net debt at approximately 12.3 per cent of GDP (which is about 85 per cent of Alberta’s 
projected revenue; see Figure 12). Net debt at 85 per cent of total revenue could be considered 
moderate relative to the other provinces but it is only so when at about one-half the 25 per cent of 
GDP level that Dodge recommended.
Another perspective on net debt levels comes from considering them in per capita terms. The per 
capita levels in 2016–17 across the six provinces are reported in Figure 13. Net debt per capita is 
greatest in Quebec and Ontario at $21,707 and $21,252 respectively, but it is also high in Manitoba 
at $17,271. In Saskatchewan and British Columbia it is much less, at $8,756 and $7,846 respectively. 
Alberta still had net assets (negative net debt) of $2,077 per person. The picture in Alberta is 
changing rapidly. By 2020–21, net debt is expected to be $11,236, but it is expected to increase only 
modestly to $11,914 when the budget is planned to balance. These levels put Alberta about midway 
in the provincial per capita net-debt ranking. Alberta is fortunate to have a substantial holding of 
financial assets (much of that in the $20.8 billion Heritage Saving Trust Fund), which reduce the 
net debt (and the income of which contributes to general revenues). While net debt in 2023–24 is 
projected to be $56 billion, the gross debt is expected to be $96 billion. Per capita, the $96 billion 
converts to $20,246 per Albertan. Also, if net debt were to be 25 per cent of GDP in 2023–24, it 
would amount to about $114 billion or about $ 24,300 per person — that is, an amount exceeding 
the current levels in Quebec and Ontario.
FIGURE 13 DOLLARS OF NET DEBT PER CAPITA, 2016–17 AND PROJECTIONS
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Figure 13. Dollars of Net Debt Per Capita, 2016–17 and Projections
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Source: Finance Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables 2017 and Budget 2018.
31 
Capital investment averaging $6 billion annually will likely be sufficient to equal the annual linear depreciation (as assumed 
in the calculations of net capital stock above) to 2023–24. However, the $4.8 billion projected in the final year will be well 
below the annual depreciation. Hence, the capital plan to 2023–24 is expected to be sufficient to meet (linear) depreciation. 
The scheduled amortization in the provincial budget (about $2.6 billion annually) is, however, substantially less than linear 
depreciation assumed. 
21
The accumulation of provincial debt, whether to finance capital or operating expenditures, imposes 
additional costs on the provincial taxpayers. Interest must be paid on the debt and, unless the debt is 
refinanced, it must be repaid. The ramping up of Alberta’s net debt over five years from effectively 
zero to $48.2 billion in 2020–21 and to $56 billion in 2023–24 adds $2.4 billion of interest cost 
to the provincial expenditures bringing that total to $3.8 billion.32 As shown in Figure 14, interest 
costs are expected to increase from 2.4 per cent to 5.5 per cent of government revenues by 2020–21 
(and then to 5.8 per cent by 2023–24).33 Given projected revenues, those charges reduce the funds 
available for spending on program expenditures; that is, services to Albertans. This is certainly 
the consequence under the plan to balance in Budget 2018. With total revenues and expenditures 
balanced in 2023–24, the $3.8 billion of debt interest will not be available to fund services.34
FIGURE 14  PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT DEBT INTEREST AS A PERCENTAGE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT  
REVENUES, 2016–17
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Figure 14. Provincial Government Debt Interest as a Percentage of 
Provincial Government Revenues, 2016–17
Sources: Finance Canada, Fiscal Reference Table 2017 and Budget 2018.
Ultimately, debt interest becomes a burden on taxpayers. Bazel et al. (2018) estimate the present  
values of the taxes on typical Alberta income-tax payers over their lifetimes that are required to  
pay $3.8 billion in annual interest. That ranges from $42,252 for a 16-year-old and rises to $49,864  
for a 36-year-old, before declining gradually to almost zero for an 80-year-old. The present value  
exceeds $40,000 for those 50 or younger. In addition, as Alberta’s former auditor general (2018,  
21) notes, “A surplus of $3 billion per year every year for 25 years would be needed to pay off the  
debt expected to be accumulated by 2021.” And beyond that, he also observed, “The surplus would 
32 
The $3.8-billion estimates comes from Bazel et al. (2018) at: https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
Fiscal-Trends-AB-Public-Debt-Bazel-Crisan-Dahlby.pdf.
33 
While net assets were still positive, but small at $3.9 billion in 2016–17, the province had $19.1 billion in debt for capital 
projects. After being a net lender for 11 of the previous 12 years, Alberta became a net borrower (i.e., began accumulating 
debt) in 2007–08.
34 
The debt-interest burden is a significant component of the expenditure restraint (particularly program expenditures) 
outlined in Budget 2018. Constraining expenditure growth to be less than inflation and population growth is the other 
major overarching component. If realized, a consequence will be that program expenditures in 2023–24 as a percentage 
of household income will be as low as it was at the depths of the years of the Klein cuts — a level about 15-per-cent 
lower than the level experienced over the past decade. See McMillan (2018) at: https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2018/10/Fiscal-Trends-AB-Gov-Spending-McMillan.pdf. Also interesting is that planned capital expenditures are 
reduced considerably for 2022-23 and 2023-24. The reduction is sufficiently large so as to be a potential concern (Dahlby, 
2018).
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need to be even more, approximately another $1 to $2 billion per year, to be able to replace and add 
infrastructure without increasing debt further.”35
Government debt implies lower services and higher taxes than otherwise. Given that it appears to 
be the case that Alberta is in a low resource-revenue environment, the province should consider 
adapting to its new fiscal situation. The provincial economy is emerging from recession so the case 
for counter-cyclical finance is past and there is logic for not protracting the fiscal adjustment and 
for not accumulating more debt than necessary. That is, even if the province can readily borrow 
and debt is not as large as in some other provinces, let the province move promptly to get its fiscal 
house in order and avoid undue and unnecessary burdens on Albertans. 
6 CAPITAL INVESTMENT AS A STABILIZATION TOOL
Government infrastructure investment is widely regarded as a valuable instrument for helping 
to moderate fluctuations in the economy. Ideally, government capital spending can be ramped up 
when the private sector is contracting and private capital investment is waning, and can then be 
reduced when the private sector and especially private investment is proceeding at a more solid 
pace — a pattern that may also allow government to take advantage of lower input costs and of 
lower interest rates if borrowing. Practical problems — for example, uncertainty about the strength 
and duration of economic cycles, ability to implement and slow valuable infrastructure spending 
in a timely fashion, the need for infrastructure to support the private sector and households in a 
growing economy — complicate implementation but, with good planning, counter-cyclical (even 
stable) infrastructure investment can be a useful stabilizing tool. 
The pattern of Alberta’s provincial infrastructure investment and its relationship with the economy 
is the topic of this section. Initially, the long-run trend is examined and compared to predicted 
levels. Then the level of provincial capital investment relative to the performance of the economy, 
as indicated by the level of unemployment, is examined.
Real per capita provincial capital investment in Alberta is presented in Figure 15 along with the 
predicted investments from two regression models. The one set of predicted levels (the red line) 
comes from a fixed effects panel analysis of the six provinces examined above. The regression 
model included unemployment, population change, real household income per capita and the real 
per capita levels of four variables indicating a provincial government’s fiscal position: investment 
income, transfers, debt-servicing costs and surplus/deficit.36 The correlation of the predicted and 
actual values is 0.816.37 The second set of predicted values (the green line) comes from a regression 
of the same variables but using the Alberta data only. These predictions correspond more closely to 
35 To preserve a historic perspective (not that the past illustrates good practice or a case that might be repeated), compare 
Alberta’s projected debt burden with that in the mid-1990s. The debt interest of $3.8 billion in 2023–24 amounts to $810 per 
capita in 2023–24 dollars. From 1994 to 1997, Albertans (not unlike the residents of many other provinces) were paying, 
at relatively high interest rates, over $800 per person in 2002 dollars in debt interest (for an average $901 per capita over 
the four years). At that time, those payments averaged almost 3.0 per cent of per capita household incomes, while $810 
per capita in 2023–24 is projected to amount to 1.2 per cent of household income. Also, as a result of fiscal restraint and 
growing revenues (particularly resource revenue), debt-interest payments per Albertan had declined to $200 (2002 dollars) 
per capita by 2003–04 and remained below that level until 2015–16. 
36 See Appendix B for the regressions.
37 
Real household income is the main determinant, while the government fiscal variables as a group are the next most 
important (with debt servicing being the most important of those) and with unemployment and population change making 
minor contributions.
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the actual investment levels (with a correlation of 0.918). The pattern of investment in Alberta is not 
as well predicted when including the behaviour in the other provinces.
FIGURE 15  ALBERTA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT PER CAPITA: ACTUAL AND PREDICTIONS,  
2007 DOLLARS, 1961–2016
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Figure 15. Alberta Provincial Government Investment Per Capita: 
ctual and Predictions, 2007 Dollars, 1961–2016
Even when using the predictions from the Alberta data, the actual data tend to have peaks 
(especially) and troughs that deviate significantly from the predicted levels. Note especially the 
years 1966–68, 1982, 2007–08 and 2014. In addition, the predictions from the six-province panel 
diverge considerably from the actual and predicted Alberta data in some years; notably 1974–75, 
1982–86, 1995–97, and, possibly one might argue, in 2009 and 2014. The confounding factor is 
the large peak-to-trough swings in Alberta’s provincial government investments. Most notable is 
that from 1981–1986, when investment averaged $1,082 per person, to the 1994-98 trough when 
investment averaged $498 per capita only to rebound to over $1,400 less than a decade later.38 
While one might expect that the maintenance of the capital stock, replacement of expired capital 
and the additions of new stock would imply relatively steady investments, clearly the decisions 
are more complicated. Comparing the regressions on the Alberta data and the panel data offers 
some insight. In both, real household income is the main determinant of the upward trend in 
provincial government investment. It is essentially the government variables, however, that explain 
the fluctuations around the trend. Also, the government variables add considerably more to the 
explanatory power of the Alberta-only analysis than to the panel analysis. Variations in the levels 
of investment income in Alberta are important, but it is a much stronger negative response to debt-
interest cost demonstrated in the Alberta-only data compared to the panel data that better explains 
provincial government investment.39 That is, the greater adverse impact of debt-interest payments 
38 
While the other five provinces have experienced a surge of provincial investment since the late 1990s, the swings have been 
less pronounced.
39 
All provinces experienced large increases in debt-interest costs during the 1980s and 1990s, but the deterioration in public 
investment in Alberta was much greater than elsewhere.
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on provincial government investment in Alberta than in the other provinces helps explain better the 
considerable swings in the Alberta investment levels. 
If public investment was used to help stabilize the economy, one would expect it to be high when 
unemployment was high and low when unemployment was low. The regression analyses found that 
unemployment was quite unimportant in explaining provincial government investment, suggesting 
that public investment has not been an important tool for economic stabilization. Alberta illustrates 
the situation. Public investment (real per capita) and the unemployment rate are plotted in Figure 16 
for Alberta. Following chronologically, investment was high when the unemployment rate was low 
from 1966 to 1969, but it continued to decline while unemployment was relatively high from 1970 
to 1973. Unemployment surged in 1982 and remained high (relative to an overall average rate of 
5.7 per cent) until 1997. Provincial government investment grew quickly to a peak in 1982 but then 
declined, although it remained relatively high until 1991. Despite a sharp uptick in and continued 
high unemployment through most of the 1990s, public investment trended down and was especially 
low from 1995 to 1998. The 2000s saw economic recovery with low levels of unemployment 
and rising levels of provincial government investment. That investment was sustained through 
the 2009–10 downturn, and then slackened, but increased in 2015 and 2016 as the government 
sought to cope with the recession triggered by the oil-price collapse. Clearly, the performance of 
Alberta’s provincial government investment as a counter-cyclical tool is mixed. Rather, provincial 
public investment has tended to increase when there were surpluses and decline when there were 
deficits.40,41 The low levels of investment during the 1990s particularly reflect efforts to reduce 
deficits but also efforts to cope with the high debt-servicing costs. Economic stabilization has 
recently appeared as an important consideration in public investment decision-making. The 
continuation of investment included in provincial budgets for 2009 and 2010 following the financial 
crisis and the accompanying energy-price drop illustrates the case. The NDP government’s Budget 
2015, expanding provincial capital spending explicitly as a means to help offset the weak economy 
that was emerging at the time, is the latest example.42
40 Although not strong, the correlation between real per capita provincial investment and the unemployment rate is positive at 
0.115. In contrast, the correlation in the other five provinces is negative, at -0.124, suggesting more counter-cyclic responses.
41 The pro-cyclic pattern of provincial expenditures in Alberta has been widely noted. For example, see many of the papers in 
Boothe and Reid (2001), Bruce et al. (1997), Ryan (2013) and Wilson (2002).
42 These observations are supported by the somewhat superior performance of unemployment as an explanatory variable of 
provincial government investment in regressions on Alberta data since 2000. Even during this short period, government 
fiscal variables explain much of the variation and, interestingly, debt-interest costs continue to be a major contributor.
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FIGURE 16  ALBERTA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT PER CAPITA IN 2007 DOLLARS AND PROVINCIAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 1961–2016
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Figure 16. Alberta Provincial Government Investment Per Capita 
in 2007 Dollars and Provincial Unemployment Rate, 1961–2016
Public investment is only one possible avenue towards stabilization efforts. More important is 
the overall government surplus/deficit. Here Alberta is on stronger footing. Figure 17 shows the 
pattern. Over the years, the province has tended to run surpluses, or save, when the economy was 
strong and unemployment low (and, typically, resource revenues large) and run deficits, or dis-save, 
when the economy was weak and unemployment high (and resource revenues typically low). Thus, 
although Alberta’s program spending is well-known to be pro-cyclical,43 the province has often 
managed to dampen the economic cycle associated with resource-revenue volatility.44 That is, the 
pro-cyclic pattern of program spending is moderated (compared to a no saving/dis-saving policy) 
by saving when the economy was strong and dis-saving when the economy was weak. Thus, while 
the province’s expenditures have been responsive to resource revenues, the saving/dis-saving 
behaviour has provided some stabilization.
43 
Ferede (2018) and Kneebone and Wilkins provide recent examinations of Alberta’s fiscal responses to fluctuations in and 
reliance upon resource revenues.
44 
The correlation between the unemployment rate and the surplus/deficit as a percentage of revenue since 1973 is fairly large 
and negative at -0.59.
26
FIGURE 17  ALBERTA SURPLUS/DEFICIT AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVENUE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 1961–2016
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Figure 17. Alberta Surplus/Deficit as a Percentage of Revenue 
and Unemployment Rate, 1961–2016
The Alberta government’s public investment has played a minor, and indeed mixed, role in 
economic stabilization since 1961 (often pro-cyclical as opposed to being counter-cyclical). Alberta 
has experienced exceptionally large swings in government investment. Those fluctuations are 
largely explained by the provincial government’s fiscal situation and notably by the magnitude of 
debt-service costs. More recently, and especially during the past decade, public investment has 
been used to counter economic downturns. The government’s overall surplus or deficit is the major 
tool in pursuing stabilization and with that, although many would consider its practices less than 
ideal, the Alberta government has demonstrated some overall success.45
7. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Over the period of this analysis (i.e., since 1961), Alberta’s per capita capital stock has varied 
widely and provincial capital investment has fluctuated dramatically — more so than is consistent 
with sound infrastructure management. Are there practices and policies that could be followed 
that might moderate the swings and stabilize public capital at appropriate levels and ensure the 
investment required to maintain those stocks and to provide for growth? Some suggestions are 
outlined here.
Initially, however, recognizing the perspective brought to the question is important. First, the focus 
here is on capital and capital investment, largely setting aside the broader expenditure/revenue 
balance. Second, and most important, is to acknowledge that the public capital stock continuously 
deteriorates and needs regular maintenance and replacement as well as needing gradual expansion 
and improvement as population, the economy and incomes grow. This situation calls for steady 
investment, not gyrations between starving and gorging, or stop-and-go financing as Alberta has 
so often witnessed. Cutting back capital investment when government revenues wane may seem 
45 The economic downturns of the past decade have witnessed rather different responses than during the 1990s. Faced with the 
setbacks of 2009 and 2015, the provincial governments were concerned about economic stabilization. While implementing 
efforts to exert greater control on expenditures, dramatic cuts (notably to capital investment) were largely avoided. As a 
result, real per capita expenditures have been quite stable and provincial infrastructure has roughly been maintained.
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appealing as deterioration and shortages do not immediately appear, but deferrals typically prove 
expensive as repairs escalate and catching up likely occurs when prices are high. Better that public 
investment be considered and treated as important as stability in operations.
To begin, the efforts of the Alberta government in the early 2000s must be acknowledged. 
Following the recommendations of the Financial Management Commission, the province 
introduced a special Capital Account in 2002–03 and Sustainability Fund in 2003–04 under its 
New Fiscal Framework. The Capital Account was to provide another source of financing for the 
province’s capital outlays and, in particular, to set aside extra revenues to pre-fund future capital 
projects. The Sustainability Fund was to house part of surplus revenues so as to have funds 
available to fund potential budget shortfalls.46 These funds were to add to available resources, to 
take the uncertainty out of capital funding and, overall, to replace volatility with predictability. 
By 2008–09, the Capital Account had grown to $6.97 billion and the Sustainability Fund to $9.85 
billion (for a total of almost $17 billion). The fiscal difficulties that followed the global financial 
crises resulted in the Capital Account being merged with the Sustainability Fund in 2010 and the 
Sustainability Fund falling to $3.3 billion in 2012–13.47 The Capital Account had potential but did 
not survive. Still, with political will and commitment, the concept could be helpful.
The fiscal difficulties that emerged in Alberta after the global financial crises saw the emergence 
of a practice that should be avoided in the future. After 2008–09, natural gas prices collapsed to 
persistently low levels and that had a serious adverse impact on provincial revenues. As part of 
its strategy to cope, the Stelmach and Redford governments began borrowing, rationalizing the 
new debt by claiming it was appropriate because it was to fund capital projects. Justifications for 
that included references to it being comparable to a household taking on a mortgage to purchase 
a house, or that it was a way to ensure greater intergenerational equity (that future generations 
should share the cost of infrastructure they, too, would benefit from). Such arguments are largely 
illusionary and misleading. 48 The first ignores that households have a finite life while society 
and its governments are perpetual. And both, if taken to their logical conclusion, would justify 
financing all government capital with debt. Such a policy would result in a large and permanent 
provincial debt and impose higher costs on taxpayers due to the interest paid. Provinces do not 
permit their municipalities to do this and they should not do it themselves. Alberta should treat 
capital investment for what it actually is: the necessary, regular and ongoing outlay/expenditure of 
society to maintain the appropriate level of infrastructure for its residents. Were that accomplished, 
debt could be reserved for coping with unexpected and short-term cyclic downturns (should 
adequate stabilization reserves not be available).
Stabilizing public investment requires a rethinking of the approach to public capital budgeting. It 
requires stepping away from approaching capital outlays as always being the category to cut first 
in austerity and augment when revenues are flush. Rather than stop-and-go financing, governments 
should budget for the cost of maintaining the real per capita capital stock — that is, funds 
adequate to maintain the existing stock and to add what is necessary to meet population growth. 
The needed amounts should be part of the annual budget just as much as operating expenditures. 
46 See Budget 2003.
47 The successor current cash reserve of the government is now approximately the same in real per capita terms.
48 See Dahlby and Smart (2016) and McMillan (2015a, 21-23) for discussion as to why governments should not rely on 
borrowing to fund capital investment. Dahlby and Smart conclude that, under scrutiny, the usual arguments for the debt 
finance of infrastructure “hold almost no water at all.” Also note, the argument/policy favouring borrowing for capital 
purposes only appeared in Alberta’s public finance in Budget 2009 and has persisted largely as a mechanism for avoiding 
or deferring difficult fiscal choices, although, more recently, the argument has shifted (beyond stabilization) to expanded 
capital outlays being required and borrowing being affordable.
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That means that the budgeted revenue base may need adjustment (in level or rearrangement) to 
accommodate an adequate and stable capital program. Especially in a resource-based economy 
such as Alberta’s, provincial government revenues are volatile. A stabilization fund (to meet both 
capital and operational needs when required) is a means of managing volatility. Contributions to 
and withdrawals from such a fund, however, must be adjusted to the realities underlying resource 
revenues to avoid depletion.49 Borrowing should not be necessary for financing capital per se. Debt 
can be reserved for meeting financing requirements (operating and capital) when revenues are 
unexpectedly insufficient and stabilization funds are inadequate.
How might such a (capital) budgeting program be realized? Bazel and Mintz (2015) suggest 
arm’s-length institutions to evaluate and prioritize government capital projects.50 While ensuring 
an economic and a long-term perspective, one must wonder whether provincial politicians (and 
departments/agencies and even voters) would be willing to relinquish so much control to an 
independent authority. As Bazel and Mintz also point out, expanding user charges for capital 
intensive public services — for example, tolling by an autonomous and self-financing highway 
authority — would be a step in the desired direction.51 There are, however, limitations to the capital 
to which charges might apply (e.g., less so for schools and hospitals). Furthermore, the separation 
of capital and current/operating budgets is problematic. In the context of Swiss cantons (provinces), 
Dafflon (2018) reviews and advocates for rules governing deficits and debt and he revisits and 
extends the golden rule of public finance to link capital and operating budgets. While the golden 
rule states that operating budgets should always be balanced or be in surplus and that governments 
should only borrow to fund capital projects, Dafflon refines it to add that interest and amortization 
of debt should be repaid from operations and that the operating and maintenance costs associated 
with capital projects should be incorporated into long-term budgeting. While self-imposed debt/
deficit management rules seem to have worked well for Swiss cantons, they have been less effective 
for Canadian provinces. Although budget-balance and debt-management rules appeared to have 
had some effect from 1981 to 2007, the provinces relaxed them following the financial crises of 
2008 and the ensuing fiscal difficulties (Tapp, 2013). Alberta is a prime example of this, as the rules 
have often been relaxed as fiscal conditions tightened.
A longer-term perspective on capital budgets would be beneficial. That is, what is called for is a 
perspective longer than that to which most political decision-makers are inclined. Possibly effective 
in promoting this is an intermediate strategy building on existing practices and institutions. The 
suggestion is that a government body would a) evaluate the status of public capital, b) assess all 
49 This point warrants a comment on recent policies. During the past decade, the province experienced two major negative 
impacts on its resource revenue — that is, as a result of a drop in natural gas prices to a persisting low level and then a drop 
in oil prices — and two recessions. Even now with some recovery in oil prices and projections of further improvements, real 
per capita resource revenues are expected to recover less than 40 per cent of the reduction experienced from the resource 
revenues realized from 2000 to 2014, and reaching even that level is expected only in 2023–24 (as projected in Budget 
2018). That is, the Alberta government is expecting resource revenues to contribute 60-per-cent less to provincial revenues 
in the longer term than in the past and less than that in the near term. Alberta has gone through those two resource-
revenue setbacks denying that they are structural changes and treating them instead as cyclical. As a result, a very healthy 
stabilization fund has been drained and debt has been accumulated. Now that the province is in recovery, it is time for 
Albertans and their government to face the reality that resource revenues will not (or at least are very unlikely to) fund 
as large a share of the programs and capital services as those to which they have become accustomed. While it is difficult 
today to look at what appears to be possible only in the rather distant future, it is recommended that the province eventually 
recognize the need for some revenue replacement and reduced borrowing as well as, in particular, abandoning borrowing 
for capital purposes. 
50 They also recommend similar but separate provincial lending institutions to assess municipal capital projects and to manage 
and control the lending for them.
51 Some municipalities have achieved success along these lines by shifting utility operations from government departments to 
self-financing independent corporations.
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capital projects under consideration, c) identify any gaps and draw implications, and d) disseminate 
the results.52 It may not be necessary that the responsibility rest with an independent authority but 
rather be a branch within Treasury or Finance. What is important is that it have a government-wide 
perspective and work with the other government departments and agencies. An important part of its 
reporting would be to assess the state of public capital devoted to the various government programs 
and determine in a general way the expenditure required to maintain that stock, allowing for 
population growth.53 Undertaking, or at least evaluating and summarizing, economic assessments 
of proposed capital projects (be they maintenance, renewal or entirely new) is a second major 
responsibility. Once having completed those first two tasks, the authority can then assess whether 
there are gaps in the capital program or areas of potential overinvestment, and outline the likely 
consequences of alternative investment strategies on the government capital stock, the services that 
stock renders and the implications for near-term and longer-term budgets.54 Finally, the results of 
its analyses should be published and open to all interested parties; budget planners and bureaucrats 
across the government but, in particular, the members of the legislature, municipalities, bodies 
and groups impacted by and interested in infrastructure decisions, and the individual citizens. A 
major objective here is to expand transparency to facilitate better decision-making. Unlike Bazel 
and Mintz’s concept, this body would have no decision-making or prioritizing power. Rather, it is 
intended to provide information and outline economic consequences. Decisions would be made 
through the regular political processes but would be based on more complete and more widely 
dispersed information. With more transparent assessment of capital planning and the implications 
at the micro and macro levels, greater stability in investments and stocks can be expected. In 
addition, these reports would provide the auditor general a benchmark with which to assess the 
province’s capital budgeting. As such, a body with capital-oversight responsibility might contribute 
to generating a long-term perspective in government as recommended in recent commentary from 
the auditor general.
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To support its economy and to serve its citizens, Alberta’s provincial government maintains a large 
stock of public infrastructure (e.g., schools, hospitals and highways). Recently, the province’s net 
capital stock has amounted to over $10,200 (in 2007 dollars) per person.55 Surprisingly, provincial 
investment has fluctuated dramatically and even the levels of capital stock have demonstrated 
large swings. In addition, in his 2015 recommendations to the province, David Dodge advised the 
province to expand considerably its capital investment and increase its level of infrastructure and 
to do so largely by borrowing. The large movements in investment and stocks are concerning and 
the Dodge recommendations pose an important policy question. Both are factors motivating this 
analysis. Their consideration is important as the province gradually emerges from recession to face 
what may be a slow recovery to a possibly rather different and more difficult economic environment.
52 
It is acknowledged that such evaluations are done now, in part; for example, see Annual Report of the Department of 
Infrastructure.
53 
Efficiency analyses such as that by Chen (2018) could provide useful input.
54 To a considerable degree, these tasks would be gathering together, building upon and providing detail on already existing 
activities of government departments and agencies.
55 Municipal government capital, also an important contributor to residents’ well-being, has amounted to one-third the 
combined provincial and municipal total and recently has expanded to one-half. Provincial grants, however, have funded 
about one-third of municipal capital investment. 
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Dodge recommended that the province increase its capital stock to 16 per cent of GDP. That 
recommendation was based on comparison of ratios of provincial government net capital stock to 
GDP in Alberta to those in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec — a 
comparison that found Alberta consistently below the five-province average (and also in investment 
to GDP) since the early 1990s. However, when examined on a per capita basis, as I have done 
here, the Alberta provincial government is found to have net capital stock 24-per-cent greater than 
the five-province average (a differential that expands to 50 per cent if municipal government net 
capital stock is included). In per capita terms, Alberta appears to have no deficiency in provincial 
government or sub-national infrastructure.
The divergence of the two indicators leads to asking whether Alberta is different. Comparison of 
the six economies indicates that Alberta is different. Over the 1990 to 2016 period, GDP per person 
in Alberta averaged 63-per-cent greater than the average of the other five provinces. In addition, 
the private, non-residential capital per person vastly exceeds the levels in the other provinces. 
As a result, corporate net operating surpluses are typically a much larger percentage of GDP and 
employee compensation and household incomes are typically lower percentages. Nevertheless, 
household incomes per capita are much larger. An exploratory econometric analysis confirmed 
that Alberta is distinct. It also confirmed that the economies of British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Ontario and Quebec are the most comparable to one another, while that of Saskatchewan (a largely 
resource-based economy like Alberta) is different and somewhat more akin to that of Alberta. 
Also, that analysis suggested that household income, not GDP, was the main positive determinant 
of provincial public capital stocks. Overall, the analyses indicate that the 16-per-cent-of-GDP 
recommendation is not a reliable guide to the appropriate level of provincial government net capital 
stock in Alberta. Public infrastructure investment decision-making is more complex and requires 
more discerning analysis.
The sharp drop in oil prices in 2014 and 2015 generated a recession in Alberta that substantially 
changed the economic picture of the province and dramatically changed the fiscal position of the 
provincial government. Due primarily to the drop in resource revenues, the province faced larger 
deficits. Partially following Dodge’s advice, the province increased capital investment (by about 
15 per cent) and maintained operating expenditures by increased borrowing. Dodge argued that 
even a net-debt-to-GDP ratio of 25 per cent (potentially emerging so as to increase the province’s 
net capital stock to 16 per cent of GDP) was “moderate” compared to the levels in the five other 
provinces. Again, however, comparison to GDP is misleading in Alberta’s case. Relative to GDP, 
the size of the provincial government is small compared to other provinces (although revenues per 
person are comparable): 13.5 per cent in 2016–17 versus a range of 17.7 to 25.9 per cent as found 
in Ontario and Quebec respectively. Since government is relatively smaller in Alberta, caution 
is necessary when comparing government debt to GDP. A 25-per-cent level of debt to GDP in 
Alberta would amount to debt that was 186 per cent of government revenue, a level surpassed 
only by the 214-per-cent level of Ontario and definitely not modest. Because it better reflects the 
burden on provincial taxpayers, measuring debt to government revenue is preferred to debt to 
GDP. The provincial government plans to balance its budget in 2023–24 with net debt amounting 
to $11,915 per person or 12.3 per cent of GDP and 85 per cent of government revenue. Despite 
this comparatively moderate level, interest on the debt will amount to $3.8 billion annually. That 
and the funds necessary to pay off the debt (perhaps $3 billion each year) will encroach on the 
resources available to provide services to the province’s residents. Keeping debt low will reduce 
the revenues required for servicing and repaying debt and free up funds for providing additional 
services or enabling lower taxes.
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Public capital investment can be an effective economic stabilization tool. Provincial government 
investment has fluctuated substantially in Alberta, most notably from about $600 per capita (in 
2007 dollars) in the early 1970s, to almost $1,100 in the early 1980s, to $500 in the mid-1990s, to 
about $1,400 from 2007 to 2011. While household income explains the upward trend, provincial 
government fiscal variables (and particularly the burden of debt servicing) accounts for much of 
the variation around the trend. Have these movements been stabilizing? Comparing provincial 
government capital investment and unemployment patterns indicates that provincial investment’s 
stabilization role has been mixed. There is even some evidence that it has been more pro-cyclic 
than counter-cyclic in its application. On the other hand, the provincial government’s overall 
surplus/deficits pattern has tended to be counter-cyclic. That is, the province has tended to run 
surpluses when the economy was strong and unemployment low and deficits when the economy 
was weak and unemployment high and, so, has often managed to dampen the economic cycle 
associated with resource-revenue volatility. In contrast to the 1990s, economic stabilization was 
a priority during the economic downturns of 2009 and 2015. That shift is reflected in provincial 
investments and, initially, dissaving and, then, borrowing. However, a failure and then a reluctance 
to adjust to the structural changes in resource-revenue setbacks (and, instead, treating them as 
cyclic) has resulted in an excessive reliance on dissaving and borrowing.
The demands for provincial infrastructure investment grow with population, the economy 
and incomes. In addition, the public capital stock continuously deteriorates and needs regular 
maintenance. These features call for steady investment, even during recessions. Stabilizing public 
investment requires rethinking the approach to public capital budgeting. That is challenging, 
particularly in a volatile resource-based economy. Nonetheless, suggestions are offered. Alberta 
tried a Capital Account in combination with a Sustainability Fund (a stabilization fund) but lacked 
the political will to hold to that course. Faced with a serious deterioration in resource revenues 
(particularly for natural gas), provincial governments began rationalizing borrowing, provided 
it was (ostensibly) used to fund capital. That rationalization is misleading, offers no permanent 
solution and risks being a costly distortion.
New options exist and are mentioned. One is for an independent capital authority to evaluate, 
prioritize and finance provincial government infrastructure. That, however, may be seen as unduly 
encroaching on the authority of provincial decision-makers. Designing rules to regulate deficits and 
debt while integrating operating and capital budgets has also been advanced as an alternative. Self-
imposed deficit/debt rules, however, have not proven very effective with provincial governments. 
A final suggestion may conform better to existing institutions. That is a, possibly independent, 
public authority to expand the information on infrastructure and increase public transparency on 
capital undertakings and their options. It would gather information on the conditions, evaluate 
options, identify gaps and excesses, and disseminate that information to political decision-makers 
and the public, but leave the decision-making to the normal political processes. Basically, it would 
be to better inform and to better integrate capital decision-making into public budgeting. As such, 
it should contribute to generating in government a longer-term perspective as recommended in the 
recent commentary by Alberta’s auditor general.
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APPENDIX A. ILLUSTRATIVE REGRESSIONS FOR EXPLAINING LEVELS OF 
PROVINCIAL CAPITAL
Regression Results for Provincial Capital as a Percentage of GDP and Provincial Capital Per Capita 
Dependent Variable: Provincial Capital as a Percentage of GDP
Variable AB & SK
Other Four Provinces 
(BC, MB, ON, QC)
Real GDP per capita (0.0006509)*** (0.0006392)***
Real HHI per capita 0.0004974*** 0.0006046***
Population 0.0000012*** 7.3E-07***
Population change (0.7389273)*** 0.5929964**
Constant 35.49831*** 18.60948***
# of observations 72 144
Correlation of predicted with actual 0.97 0.82
     
Dependent Variable: Provincial Capital Per Capita
Variable AB & SK
Other Four Provinces 
(BC, MB, ON, QC)
Real GDP per capita (0.1286171)*** (0.0600807)**
Real HHI per capita 0.3017012*** 0.2593061***
Population (0.0008414)*** 0.0001213
Population change (583.1987)*** 228.5885**
Constant 8907.703*** 107.1537
# of observations 72 144
Correlation of predicted with actual 0.88 0.85
Note: Regressions are run on data covering 1981 to 2016 using panel regressions with fixed effects for provinces. 
Brackets indicate negative numbers. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10-, five- and 
one-per-cent levels.
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APPENDIX B. REGRESSIONS TO PREDICT ALBERTA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
INVESTMENT PER CAPITA
Results of Alternative Regressions to Alberta Government Investment Per Capita
Alberta  Six Provinces  
(BC, AB, SK, MB, ON, QC)
Unemployment rate 19.78526 (42.15697)**
Population change, percentage (28.58009) 12.28469
Household income, real per capita 0.0226099*** 0.0202545***
Prov. Investment income, real per capita 0.113181*** 0.0708958
Transfers to province, real per capita (0.2390039)*** 0.1945796***
Prov. debt servicing cost, real per capita (0.7622642)*** (0.2127891)**
Prov. Surplus/deficit, real per capita (0.1167292)*** (0.1009037)***
Constant 402.1454*** 251.454**
# of observations 56 336
Correlation of predicted with actual 0.918 0.816
Note: Regressions are run on data covering 1961 to 2016 using panel regressions with fixed effects for provinces when 
data from the six provinces are used but ordinary least squares when only Alberta data are used. Brackets indicate 
negative numbers. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10-, five- and one-per-cent levels.
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